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Abstract: We examine the conservation effects attributable to changes in the size of community-
governed protected areas (PAs) by adopting a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design
with a two-way fixed effect regression model and synthetic control methods. Panel data from the
extraordinary datasets of the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPAs) and the Red List of
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are used for 32 Sub-Saharan African
countries in this study. Our generalized DID estimates show that countries with community-governed
PAs have reduced the IUCN Red List threat level by 17% for mammals. We also find stronger evidence
of the effect of community-governed PAs on the IUCN threat level using synthetic control method
that allows us to match the “intervention countries” with those countries that exhibit similar pre-
intervention threat level. Our results are robust on alternate specifications in which we exploit
variations in the cumulative size of the designated PAs differentiated by the IUCN governance
types. We also compare the effect of strictly state-governed PAs with community-governed PAs. Our
findings provide evidence in support of recent qualitative studies that find positive responses of
community participation towards common goods that carry potential economic incentives. This paper
contributes to the idea that inclusive environmental policies and legislations yield environmental
gains not at the cost of social exclusion.
Keywords: governance; protected areas; biodiversity conservation; Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Introduction
Conservation of biological diversity is one of the key sustainable development goals
(SDGs) that seeks to protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of ecosystem services and
reduce threat to biodiversity [1]. The expanding global economy coupled with increased
human population poses a continuous threat to biodiversity [2]. Some scholars caution that
nearly half of the world’s wildlife species could be on extinction within the next few decades
if the inverse relationship between economic growth and biodiversity continues [3,4].
Given the importance of biodiversity, there have been growing efforts to conserve
wildlife in developing countries that inhabit most of the world’s biodiversity. One of
these efforts is the designation of protected areas (PAs) by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) through various donor support programs. However, there
are rising concerns in developing countries that increasing size of protected areas leads to
the systematic exclusion of local communities from natural resource use that results into
the failure of biodiversity conservation projects [5].
Governance of protected areas, defined as who holds authority, responsibility, and
accountability for decisions in protected areas, is considered an important factor that ex-
plains variation in biodiversity conservation outcomes [6]. Many development experts
maintain that the systematic inclusion of the local communities in the governance of pro-
tected areas under certain agreements can guarantee the sustainability of natural resource
use [2]. In addition, proponents of sustainable development argue that inclusion of local
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communities can be a ‘win–win’ strategy that generates both economic and environmental
benefits [2,7–13].
Despite widespread recognition of community-based conservation in recent years,
there is dearth of empirical evidence on whether countries with larger size of community-
governed protected areas do better in terms of national biodiversity conservation statistics.
For example, a recent meta-analytical study evaluating the impact of PAs on species
population finds positive impact of PAs on habitat cover with inconclusive evidence on
whether PAs are effective for species conservation [14]. Although, a global analysis by
Oldekop et al. [15] shows a positive association between the socioeconomic and biodiversity
conservation outcomes of PAs, however, this study does not consider any precise variation
in the governance arrangements within protected areas and suggests possible influence
of such arrangements on the social and biodiversity conservation objectives. Besides, the
literature also points to the lack of macro-level causal connection between governance
(management) and biodiversity conservation outcomes across different countries [16–18].
The next section sheds light on the history and evolution of designated protected areas
as a conservation policy and its relationship with conservation outcomes vis-à-vis economic
incentive mechanisms in the light of previous studies. Then, the following sections describe
data, methods, specifications, and findings. The last two sections discuss and conclude.
2. Literature Review
Since the start of modern protected areas movement in North America, Australia,
New Zealand, and South Africa in the late nineteenth century, the idea of protected
areas spread around the world in the twentieth century with different driving forces. For
example, in North America, many protected areas were exclusively designated to safeguard
dramatic and sublime scenery of natural heritage, or geo-heritage, such as minerals and
fossils while, in Africa, the concern was with game parks [19]. In 2016, there were a
total of 202,467 protected sites, over a 20 million km2 area, or nearly 14.7% of the earth’s
land [20]. One of the most important purposes of many designated PAs is the preservation
of constituent species and ecosystem services [21–24]. Understanding of the conditions
under which such PAs are designated and how they deliver their biodiversity conservation
outcome is therefore important for policy makers and conservation specialists to adopt
sustainable courses of actions.
The IUCN officially defines PA as “a clearly defined geographical space, recognized,
dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term
conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” [22] (p. 30).
The World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) -a joint initiative between the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Conservation Monitoring Centre
(UNEP-WCMC), the IUCN and the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA)- is the
largest database that collects, compiles and reports data on marine and terrestrial PAs in
collaboration with various governmental and non-governmental organizations, academia,
and industry. Its aim is to develop and maintain an accurate and freely available up-to-date
database on PAs status around the world to be used as a global standard by all relevant
stakeholders [25].
In the WDPA database, the governance of PAs is sorted out with many categories.
These include: PAs established by the government; areas established under the regional
and international conventions; privately owned conservation areas; and areas conserved
by indigenous people and local communities. The IUCN has further two broad types
of classifications: (1) management categories and (2) governance types. The protected
area management categories help us classify PAs based on their primary management
objectives [22] while the governance types classify PAs according to who holds authority,
responsibility, and accountability for them [26]. Currently about 65% of the PAs in the
WDPA have an IUCN Management Category, and 88% have governance types [27]. In this
paper, we use the latter classification because it sufficiently tells us the extent to which
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authority, responsibility and accountability is devolved to the lower level in terms of
resource use.
2.1. Governance of Protected Areas
Governance refers to the process of decision-making and exercising of authority in an
organization. According to Graham, Amos and Plumptre [6], governance of PAs is defined
as interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine the extent to
which power is exercised, responsibility is shared, the way decisions are taken and how
citizens or other stakeholders participate in the process. Achievement of the protected areas’
objectives is closely associated with the extent of power and decision-making capacity,
responsibilities sharing, rights to use and the way financial, political, or communal support
is generated around PAs [28].
Ever since PAs have been used for conservation, decisions about how to protect,
conserve and use the natural resources inside or around the PAs have been done by the
state (central or local government), international organizations, private owners, or local
communities. Recently, there has been increasing attention to understand the nature of
governance in terms of appropriateness to the specific context, effectiveness in delivering
lasting results and livelihood benefits under different governance regimes [26]. Although
an ideal governance setting does not exist for all PAs, the IUCN suggests a set of “good
governance” principles (indicators) that can provide insights about the way specific gov-
ernance settings contribute to protecting livelihood, rights and values of the indigenous
people in or around these areas [20,21]. The key concepts of IUCN governance category
include, participation, innovation, benefits sharing, respect and informed approval of the
stakeholders. According to the IUCN, the purpose of creating this variable is to measure
the extent to which full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders including local
peoples is ensured, and the proportion of benefits shared equitably [26]. Figure 1 shows
the distribution of the four types of governance variables, which are discussed in the
following text.
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2.1.1. State PAs and Conservation Outcomes
The state PAs are characterized by strict government control over the designated areas
in terms of authority, responsibility and accountability in decisions and determination of
its conservation objectives [20]. Usually, a ministry or PA agency under the national or sub-
national government is responsible for the management and development of enforcement
plans for the PAs. In most of the cases, central governments take overall control of PAs
and make all major decisions with a little or no say from the local people in or around
PAs [14,28]. Historically, state PA was the dominant type of governance, however, recently,
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there have been increasing efforts in delegating the authority to the sub-national level or
local level [28–30].
Although the establishment of PAs is considered a great achievement per se, many
environmentalists and social scientists believe that state PAs alone cannot safeguard preser-
vation of biodiversity due to multiple reasons [25,26,31–33]. For example, many state PAs
have been established under the top-down approach of the nineteenth century [24,34].
Such PAs have failed to consider social, cultural, and political values that are important for
the indigenous communities [23]. Governments frequently deprive communities from ex-
tracting resources that are essential for their livelihoods, and in some cases, local people are
pushed out from their lands with no consultation or appropriate compensation [35]. This
often results in adverse social impact on local communities that include disruption of their
traditional way of living, lack of cooperation with protected areas’ authorities and hostile
attitude towards nature [36–39]. In addition, conflicts emerge between state authorities
and local people that reduce the effectiveness of PAs in conservation outcomes [11,31,40].
In the later section of this paper, we extend this discussion to some country specific cases
where conflicts between states and local people have emerged.
2.1.2. Community-Governed PAs and Conservation Outcomes
The effect of the inappropriate protected areas’ management on the livelihood of local
people is well documented [22,23,37,41–43]. A number of studies report concerns of local
communities about their exclusion from getting benefits from the local natural resources,
such as forests, wildlife, and vegetation [35,40,43–46]. Local communities in many devel-
oping countries depend on the natural resources that PAs seek to preserve as part of their
livelihoods. For example, people living in or around a forest reserve might depend on the
forest use for fuel, plants and vegetation for their livestock, agriculture, and wildlife for
proteins, etc. Therefore, their interest in PA management and negotiation for their share
of the costs and benefits related with conservation policies is well recognized [23,47]. In
most cases, local communities seek access to local resources, overcome human–wildlife
conflicts and get their share in financial benefits arising from the natural resource, such as
trophy payments, employment, tourism ventures and market for local products [33,36,48].
In addition to their livelihood attachment, local people also have knowledge and practical
traditions about biodiversity conservation that they have developed historically [49]. As
a result, the recent decades have seen increasing interventions in developing countries
that encourage governments to devolve authority to local communities and adopt inclu-
sive strategies in identifying priorities for natural resource management, particularly in
protected areas.
The IUCN categorization of governance helps us understand the extent to which pro-
tected areas’ governance has been decentralized and local people are involved in decision
making about the PA management. Community-governed PAs are formally defined as
“PAs where the management, authority and responsibility rests with indigenous peoples
and/or local communities who have roles in various forms of customary or legal, formal or
informal institutions and rules” [22] (p. 26). Both local community and indigenous people
under this definition are associated with the concept of “commons” which refers to a form
of natural resource that requires governance and management collectively by a community
of people [50]. The last decade has seen significant developments in the recognition and
development of indigenous people for conservation of biodiversity. The terms “indige-
nous people” and “community conserved territories and areas” (ICCAs) are now being
frequently used to describe natural ecosystems that contain significant biodiversity along
with ecological benefits and cultural values while conserved by indigenous peoples and
local communities through customary laws or other effective means [22,26]. This form
of governance has three essential characteristics; (1) close and profound relation of local
communities with the site; (2) community’s major role in decision-making; and (3) the
community’s decisions lead to positive conservation outcomes due to benefits they seek
from optimal use of natural resources.
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2.1.3. Other Forms of Protected Areas’ Governance
The other two forms of PAs governance are collaborative or joint governance and
the governance by private owners. The terms joint governance, shared governance, co-
management, and collaborative management are sometimes used interchangeably. Collab-
orative governance is usually featured by a form of governance in which decision-making
authority and responsibility rests with one agency, which is required to inform or consult
other stakeholders when planning or implementing a specific plan [26]. The private gov-
ernance comprises protected areas governed by individuals, NGOs or corporate entities
called “private protected areas” such as private ranches etc. This form of governance is
more common in developed countries. Since this study’s main focus is on the Sub-Saharan
African countries (more discussion in methodology section), therefore, the governance by
private owners is not discussed in much detail here.
2.2. Economic Incentives and Community Involvement in PAs
Community-based conservation programs are based on the premise of perceived
financial incentives from regulated hunting of endangered mammals for local communities
who are committed to conserve them for their own benefits [37,44,51]. The expectations
of direct and indirect benefits (e.g., hunting, ecotourism etc.) can make them interested in
being engaged in conservation programs. Studies have shown high motivation and interest
in participation in community-based conservation programs in general where the potential
for these incentives is higher [39,44,52]. A large number of country-specific case studies
have individually attempted to find major factors that lead to better compliance with
conservation plans [34,40,44,52–58]. Conventional conservation policies, such as establish-
ing national parks, often lead to conflicts between government and local communities by
restricting local communities from using natural resources including wildlife in protected
areas and even displacing them forcibly out of their villages [37]. Such conflicts might arise
because economically poor local communities who live on subsistence agriculture in their
traditional lands perceive wildlife mainly as a threat to their livelihoods [59].
To what extent the holding of authority, responsibility, and accountability in making
key decisions for PAs affects the conservation outcomes is the question that lacks empirical
answer. To understand the relations between governance and conservation outcomes, it is
important to identify the channel through which such an effect might reach the ultimate
objectives of PAs’ conservation of threatened species. Considering the number of studies
that find economic incentives as a tool for conservation of threatened species, especially
mammals [12,23,51,60–63], two important assumptions are important to be held before
hypothesizing any effect of community participation on conservation outcomes. First,
given their livelihood constraints and dependencies on local resources, people in poor
countries are primarily not concerned with conservation objectives that global forces, such
as the IUCN, seek. Secondly, in the past two decades, the market value of wildlife products
has increased significantly due to regulations and limitations imposed by the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). In other words, if there are no
potential economic benefits of the target resource, local people are less likely to affect
conservation outcomes. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis on 42 studies from 35 papers by
Geldmann et al. [14] measuring the effectiveness of PAs on species populations, finds no
direct impact of PAs establishment on species population. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Countries with relatively larger size of community-governed protected areas do better
than countries with relatively larger size of state-governed protected areas in conservation
of species that carry potentially higher economic incentives for local people.
3. Data and Methods
This paper uses three different empirical approaches. We first exploit the variation in
the size of designated protected areas under different governance systems and group coun-
tries into inclusive (community-governed) PAs (treatment group) and non-inclusive (strictly
governed by government) protected areas (comparison group). To measure the causal
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effect, we apply a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) model that involves multiple
treated units and periods as suggested by Wing et al. [64] and synthetic control methods
developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller [65,66] and Galiani and Quistorff [67].
Appendix A Figure A2 shows countries’ distribution in treatment and comparison groups
based on the observed variations in the cumulative size of the community-governed PAs.
We also use ordinary least square (OLS) fixed effect multiple regression method to check
the robustness of the effect of PAs governance on the proportion of threatened mammals
and birds. Our findings supplement recent individual qualitative studies and some meta-
analytical findings that suggest positive conservation and socio-economic outcomes of
community-governed PAs strictly-state-governed protected areas [15].
We select Sub-Saharan African countries for three reasons. First, serious biodiversity
loss particularly in mammals and birds coincides with high poverty rates in Sub-Saharan
African countries [2]. Second, over the last twenty years, community-based interventions
have been made widely in Sub-Saharan Africa as mechanisms to combine rural develop-
ment and conservation efforts [23–25]. Third, Sub-Saharan African countries share similar
characteristics in terms of biodiversity richness and species diversity.
3.1. Data and Variables Description
In order to examine the effect of the governance of PAs on the population of threatened
species, we use the IUCN Red List as a measure of environmental degradation, the outcome
variable. The IUCN Red List is a globally recognized approach for assessing and monitoring
the status of biodiversity [68]. The scientific objectivity of the IUCN Red List is assessed
through the Red List Categories and Criteria developed in 1994 and revised in 2001 [69].
According to this criterion, there are nine categories: extinct, extinct in the wild, critically
endangered, endangered, vulnerable, near threatened, least concern, data deficient, and
not evaluated. Every surveyed specie falls into one of these categories. So far, the IUCN
has developed quantitative criteria for three categories: critically endangered, endangered,
and vulnerable. Species listed within each of these categories are believed to share a similar
probability of extinction risk [22]. Species falling into the categories of critically endangered,
or endangered and vulnerable are collectively described as ‘threatened’ and are generally
used as a measure of threat to biodiversity. Consistent with IUCN classification, our
measure of biodiversity loss in a country is the number of mammals and bird’s species
known to be threatened from 2000 to 2016. These two taxonomic groups have been
comprehensively assessed since 2000. Previous studies that have used this measure include
Mikkelson et al. [70] and Naidoo and Adamowicz, [71].
To measure each country’s biodiversity-related governance policy, the World Database
on Protected Areas (WDPA-IUCN) offers a range of variables that cover the nature of
governance and management objectives within PAs in each country around the world. The
governance category segregates PAs according to “who holds authority, responsibility and
accountability for the PAs resources” [22,26]. We use the IUCN Protected Area Management
Category and Governance Type Matrix developed by Borrini-Feyerabend et al. [26] to clas-
sify protected areas’ categories that qualify two broad governance criteria: state-governed
PAs and community-governed PAs. We use variables on the reported size of the conserved
area, governance type and year of designation as an indicator of inclusiveness of the local
people in the decision-making related to the designated PAs [72]. Since the focus of this
study is terrestrial protected areas, therefore we exclude marine protected areas from our
data. Further, we also exclude designated areas, which come under the category of natural
monuments. We also assume that the ownership of protected areas to be independent of
the relationship of government and management structures of PAs. Due to the long history
of PAs establishment and multiple designation in each year, we collapse (sum) the size
of designated protected areas (in km2) by year and cumulate since the 1980s. To match
each country’s protected areas’ status with the IUCN Red List, we keep the cumulative
PAs (in three different governance types e.g., state-governed, community-governed, and
not-reported) from 2000 to 2016. The cumulated status of PAs in each country in a year
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captures the size of the PAs separated with different governance levels. Due to increased
interventions in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries, there is considerable variation
in the size of designated areas in each subsequent year since 2000.
We utilize this variation to measure the country’s ability to devolve power, authority,
and accountability of PAs to the local community. We implicitly controlled for the gross
wildlife exports value by using the CITES data on the exports of endangered species
from Sub-Saharan African countries. The CITES database offers data on the number
and size of wildlife products including trophies, live and dead bodies, skins and others
with clear geneses and taxonomic classifications. We use the data on CITES reported by
importing countries. We do this because of the weak reporting standards of the exporting
countries mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The variable of gross exports is expected to
be positively correlated with the IUCN threat level due to the trade sanctions on the
endangered mammals and birds listed by the CITES.
To measure the level of economic development, we use GDP per capita (constant
2010 USD) from the World Bank Archives (2000–2016). Previous studies have used GDP
per capita as an important determinant of threat to biodiversity [70,71]. To account for the
country-specific differences in habitat, we use forest area as a percentage of total land area
that may have a direct effect on the number of species threatened. We also control for other
observable characteristics that might affect biodiversity including rule of law and political
stability. Data on forest cover, income, rule of law and political stability are obtained from
World Bank Tables. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in this work.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Main Variables (Year 2000 to 2016) Sub-Saharan African Countries.
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
Number of Mammals Threatened 543 18.24 14.35 2 120
Number of Birds Threatened 543 14.54 10.83 0 50
% Change in Threat for Mammals * 543 0.03 0.30 −1 2
% Change in Threat Level for Birds * 543 0.07 0.60 −1 4
Threat Rate for Mammals ** 511 0.06 0.44 −1 5
Threat Rate for Birds ** 505 0.17 0.89 −1 8
Community Governed Protected Area (km2) 544 18,164.34 37,609.64 0 195,062
State Governed Protected Area (km2) 544 51,435.37 62,440.15 0 257,734
Protected Area Not-Reported (km2) 544 19,237.89 45,541.91 0 251,281
Total Protected Area (km2) 544 88,837.60 99,286.12 108 468,819
CG ratio to Total Protected Area 544 0.21 0.24 0 1
SG ratio to Total Protected Area 544 0.59 0.32 0 1
NR ratio to Total Protected Area 544 0.20 0.28 0 1
Forest Area (% of Land Area) 512 30.91 23.47 1 89
Forest area (sq. km) 512 155,271.75 282,226.16 382 1,572,490
GDP Per Capita (constant 2010 US$) 544 2124.97 3388.72 194 20,334
Population Density (People/km2) 448 84.91 118.20 2 622
Government Effectiveness (WB est) 512 −0.71 0.61 −2 1
Political Stability (WB est) 512 −0.51 0.90 −3 1
Rule of Law (WB est) 512 −0.66 0.64 −2 1
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) 508 14.01 11.96 0 89
Illegal Export Quantity 562 47.22 183.53 0 2090
Illegal Export Value 562 14,700,447.90 79,861,348.51 0 1.09 × 109
Notes: Table 1 shows the panel data on 32 Sub-Saharan Countries from 2000 to 2016. Data on the number of mammals and birds
threatened are obtained from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List. Data on the governance of PAs
are taken from the IUCN World Database on PAs. Data on the quantity and value of illegal-ly exported trophies are obtained from the
Conventional on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) database. Corresponding prices of each genus of exported trophies are
obtained from each country concerned ministries. Data on all other variables are taken from the World Bank Tables archives % change in
threat = [(Tt − T2000)/T2000]. * Threat rate = [(Tt − Tt−1)/Tt−1].
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3847 8 of 27
3.2. The Generalized Difference-in-Difference Approach
We first adopt a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design to analyze the effect
of countries with larger size of community-governed PAs (henceforth, treatment group)
on the conservation outcomes using two-way fixed effects regression model. Generalized
DID model allows for using different treatment units and multiple pre-and-post periods
using fixed effect models [64]. The typical DID design where two groups and two periods
are utilized does not accommodate the complexity encountered in cases where multiple
units are exposed to treatment at multiple time periods. Recent studies, such as Hao and
Cowan [73], Harper et al. [74] and Anderson et al. [75], have adopted this approach to
estimate the causal effect of state adoption of medical marijuana laws on the neighboring
states. Using this design, for group ≥ 2 and time ≥ 2 periods, (Treatment)it = 1 if the
treatment is active in group i and period t; otherwise, (Treatment)it = 0. Similar to the two-
group two-period case, the core assumption in the generalized DID is that any unmeasured
determinants of the outcomes are either time invariant or group invariant. We estimate the
outcome variable Y in country i in year t using the generalized DID equation as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1(Treatment)it + β2(X)it + Ci + τt + εit (1)
where the variable (Treatment)it is a dummy variable that equals 1 for country Ci in the
post-treatment period (after the country has introduced community-governed PAs) and is
0 otherwise. Xit is a vector of control variables that include log of the trophy exports, forest
area, population density and gross domestic product in country i in year t. In Equation (1),
the Ci represents the combined effects of the time-invariant characteristics of country i, and
τt represents the combined effects of the time-varying but group-invariant factors. This two-
way fixed effect parameterization stems from the typical parallel trend assumption involved
in the two-group two-period DID, but it enables us to capture more variation in the details
of the research design. We are more confident about our results after using unit-specific
time trends and finding no significant change in the treatment coefficient. Otherwise, we
might wonder whether our treatment effect has absorbed differences between treatment
countries due to an underlying time trend-something that happens when policies kick in at
different points in time.
3.3. The Synthetic Control Methods
We also adopt the synthetic control method (SCM) to estimate the treatment effect
of the countries with a larger size of community-governed PAs on the IUCN Red List
of threatened mammals and birds. The SCM allows us to quantitatively estimate effects
in small sample settings in a manner suggested by Abadie and Gardeazabal [76] and
Abadie et al. [65,66]. The synth_runner command in STATA-16 provides tools to automate
the process of conducting in-place placebos and calculating inference on the various
possible measures. Following Cavallo et al. [77], this modified version of Synth command
extends the initial estimation strategy to allow for multiple units that receive treatment at
potentially different times, allowing for matching on trends in the outcome variable rather
than on the level besides other important features. In Figure 2 we graphically examine the
effect of the treatment countries compared to their synthetic controls’ counterparts. While
using DID method, we normally assume that the effects of unobserved confounders are
constant over time, the synthetic control method allows for these effects to change over
time, by re-weighting the control group so that it has similar pre-program characteristics to
the treated group. The observed outcome can be written as the sum of the treatment effect
and the treatment-free potential outcomes such that:
Yit = YNit + αitDit (2)
YNit = δt + γtµi + θtZi + εit (3)
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where δt represents the time-fixed effect, Zi represents a vector of time-invariant predictors
coupled with time-varying coefficient, θt, µi represents a vector of time-invariant unob-
served predictor variables with time-varying coefficient γt, variable Dit is an indicator that
takes the value 1 for the treated unit after T0 and is 0 otherwise, and the εit represents the
unobserved transitory shocks. The SCM generalizes the DID method under the assumption
of linear relationship between the outcome and the predictors by allowing the effect of γt of
the unobserved predictors µi to vary over time unlike typical DID methods that constrain
such effects to be constant.
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3.4. Alternate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Fixed Effect Method
To check the robustness of the effect of PAs governance on the proportion of threatened
mammals and birds, we also use OLS fixed effect multiple regression method. It is well
documented that in using cross-country data, country fixed effect helps us loosen up the
assumption of commonality across countries by estimating a separate constant for each
country [78,79]. We also additionally control for specific time-trends using the year-fixed
effect. To capture the inclusion of local communities in protected areas’ governance, we use
the IUCN World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) to measure community-governed
PAs and state-governed PAs for a panel of Sub-Saharan African Countries over the period
2000–2016. In doing so, we divide total protected areas into three types: state-strictly-
governed, community-governed, and protected areas-not-reported. Since habitat size may
directly affect biodiversity as suggested by previous studies e.g., [17] etc., we use the size
of PAs governed strictly by state and PAs-not-reported as control variables to isolate the
only variation in the size of community-governed PAs.
We adopt the following model to estimate the effect of PAs overnance on the IUCN
threat level.
THREATit = α0 + α1CGit + α2SGit + α3lnGDPit + α4lnTEit + α5l FRit + α6RLit + α7PSit + Ci + Yt + εit (4)
where
THREAT =
(Threatened X in year t − Threatened X in year 2000)
Threatened X in year 2000
The threat rate is calculated as the percentage change in the number of X (taxonomic
group, e.g., ammals and birds) compared to base year 2000 in country i in year t. The
threshold is 0 which means that if a country’s endangered mammals population remains
the same, it is the least good indication. The negative sign of threat signifies the country’s
good performance towards biodiversity conservation.
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Variables CG, SG and NR in Equation (4) represent a country’s PAs governance by
community, state and “governance-not-reported” respectively measured as cumulative size
(in km2). The log of GDP per capita represents the income per capita in country i in year t.
Variables TE is the gross value of trophy exports from country i in year t, FR is the forest
areas as a percent of total land area in country i in year t, RL and PS are a country’s score
on rule of law and political stability respectively measured in units of standard deviations
(−2.5 to 2.5) in year t. Country fixed-effect and year fixed effects are represented by Ci and
Yt while εit is the error term clustered at country level.
4. Findings
4.1. Estimates from the Generalized Difference-in-Difference Approach
Table 2 below shows the generalized diff-in-diff estimates of the treatment effect on
the IUCN Red List threat to mammals in 32 Sub-Saharan countries. Column (1) through
column (5) show addition of control variables following Equation (1). The generalized
diff-in-diff estimates show significantly negative effects of the treatment on the IUCN Red
List threat to mammals. On average, countries with a significant increase in cumulative
size of community-governed PAs (treatment) are likely to decrease the IUCN threat to
mammals by nearly 17% as compared to the control countries. Additionally, the coefficient
of the log of the trophy exports shows that illegal exports of trophy animals exacerbate
the IUCN Red List threat level. Columns (4) and (5) separately control for the potential
effect of economic growth and population density respectively. We control for country
fixed effect as well as year fixed effect throughout regressions.
Table 2. Treatment Effect on the IUCN Threat to Mammals (Generalized Diff-in-Diff Estimates).
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment −0.171 *** −0.166 *** −0.170 *** −0.161 *** −0.169 ***
(0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0390) (0.0394) (0.0391)
Log of Trophy Export
(value in USD) 0.00476 * 0.00507 * 0.00479 * 0.00507 *
(0.00261) (0.00282) (0.00282) (0.00282)
Log of Forest Area
(% of Land Area) −0.106 −0.124 −0.0969
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128)
Log of GDP per Capita −0.119
(0.0767)
Log of Population Density 0.187
(0.274)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 543 543 511 511 511
R-squared 0.519 0.523 0.503 0.505 0.506
Notes: The outcome variable is the IUCN Red List threat level for mammals. Variable treatment represents the
set of countries for which the cumulative size of community-governed PAs increased significantly over the last
17 years. Standard errors are clustered at country level while statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 3 follows the same generalized diff-in-diff specification on the IUCN Red List
of Birds as an outcome variable. The results show positive but statistically insignificant
effect of the treatment variable on the population of threatened birds in the IUCN Red List
controlling for all available covariates. The coefficient of the log of trophy exports volume,
an indicator of the illegal trade of endangered species shows an increasing effect of the
illegal exports on the population of birds (statistically more significant than the effect on
mammals). Similarly, the coefficient of the forest area as a percentage of total land area,
the habitat for birds, shows that increased forest cover significantly decreases the threat to
birds. We discuss the implication of these coefficients in the Section 5.
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Table 3. Treatment Effect on the IUCN Threat to Birds (Generalized Diff-in-Diff Estimates).
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment 0.0686 0.0870 0.0641 0.0914 0.0657
(0.0626) (0.0619) (0.0609) (0.0610) (0.0609)
Log of Trophy Export
(value in USD) 0.0164 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0169 *** 0.0178 ***
(0.00422) (0.00440) (0.00437) (0.00441)
Log of Forest Area
(% of Land Area) −0.667 *** −0.722 *** −0.650 ***
(0.198) (0.197) (0.199)
Log of GDP per Capita −0.362 ***
(0.119)
Log of Population Density 0.363
(0.428)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 543 543 511 511 511
R-squared 0.472 0.487 0.483 0.493 0.483
Notes: The outcome variable is the IUCN Red List Threat level for Birds. Variable treatment represents the set of
countries for which the cumulative size of community-governed protected areas (PAs) increased significantly
over the last 17 years. Standard errors are clustered at country level while statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10%
levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
4.2. Estimates from the Synthetic Control Methods
Figure 2 shows the estimated effect of the treatment on the IUCN Red List threat
to mammals in Sub-Saharan countries. We follow the method used in Galiani and Quis-
torff [67] that allows for multiple treatment groups at multiple time periods (since we have
many “treated” counties at different years). The results indicate that a negative trend in the
IUCN Red List threat to mammals after the community-based interventions increased the
size of PAs (Figure 2A). Figure 2B shows indicates a proportionally smaller effect in contrast
to the synthetic control countries that indicates a negative trend in the treated countries on
average. At first glance, this seems fairly small, however, this effect is significantly large
given the range of outcome variables (−1 to 2). In this context, a drop of IUCN threat level
from nearly 0.14 to below 0 is substantial achievement considering the fact that any positive
threat level signifies weak performance of countries in terms of conservations outcomes.
On average, our synthetic control results support our hypothesis that countries that have
increased the size of their PAs governed by local people have substantially reduced the
IUCN threat to mammals.
4.3. Estimates from the Alternate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Fixed Effect Method
We also show the results of OLS panel fixed effect estimates on Equation (4) using the
panel data from 2000 to 2016. Table 4 compares the effect of community and state-governed
PAs using Equation (4) on two different outcome variables, threat to mammals and threat to
birds, using the treatment variable as a ratio of the total protected areas in panel A and as an
absolute value of the cumulative size of the community-governed protected areas in Panel
B. After controlling for country-specific characteristics (fixed effects) and factors affecting
threat to mammals and birds in Sub-Saharan countries, the coefficient of the treatment vari-
able is negative and significant on both Panel A and Panel B. On the other hand, the effect
of the community-governed PAs on the threat to birds is not significant, indicating no effect
of governance type on the threatened birds’ population in Sub-Saharan African countries.
The state-governed PAs effect is not significant both for mammals and birds indicating less
effectiveness of strictly state-governed PAs compared to community-governed PAs. In both
panel A and Panel B, the reference PA is the ratio and size of PAs not-reported, respectively.
These results are suggestive of the importance of PAs governance mechanism in achieving
biodiversity outcomes, consistent with previous country-specific studies that find different
results of community-based conservation programs [23,44,51,80,81]. A notable point in
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Table 4 is to see the direct effect of community-governed PAs size on threatened mam-
mals that appears to be significant at 10 percent indicating a negative correlation between
community-governed PAs and threat to mammals. This is in line with studies that find
evidence on the positive effect of community participation on the conservation of species
population and suggests further institutional understanding of the conditions under which
PAs succeed or fail to deliver conservation outcomes [14].
Table 4. Impact of Community-Governed Protected Areas on Threat to Mammals and Birds.
Mammals Birds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Ratio of the Total Protected Area
Community-Governed PAs −0.117 −0.125 −0.148 * 0.355 0.167 0.139
(0.0946) (0.200) (0.198) (0.239) (0.321) (0.319)
State-Governed PAs 0.0327 0.0936 0.146 −0.149 0.192 0.530
(0.110) (0.168) (0.176) (0.225) (0.395) (0.387)
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Observations 543 543 479 543 543 479
R-squared 0.013 0.155 0.145 0.037 0.472 0.517
No. of Countries 32 32 32 32
Panel B: Cum. Size in 10K km2
Community-Governed PAs 0.00584 * −0.0195 ** −0.0178 ** 0.0131 −0.00528 −0.00348
(0.00338) (0.00749) (0.00804) (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.0120)
State-Governed PAs −0.00109 −0.0108 −0.00978 −0.00857 −0.0183 −0.0173
(0.00436) (0.0101) (0.00943) (0.00926) (0.0167) (0.0131)
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Country FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Observations 543 543 479 543 543 479
R-squared 0.005 0.166 0.151 0.011 0.473 0.510
No. of Countries 32 32 32 32
Mean of the Dep. Variable: 0.0306 0.0306 0.0306 0.065 0.065 0.065
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of threatened mammals and birds to the base years 2000 calculated as threat
rate = [(Tt − T2000)/T2000]. Panel A uses community-governed PAs and state-governed protected areas’ size as a ratio of the total PAs in
each country while Panel B uses the variation in the cumulative size of community-governed PAs and state-governed PAs (in 10,000 km2).
The reference is areas not-reported for governance. Columns (1) and (4) use pooled OLS regression while Columns (2) and (5) applies
country and year FE respectively. Controls added in column (3) and (6) include the log of GDP per capita, log of Illegal trophy exports (in
USD), forest area as a percentage of total land area, and the rule of law. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Relevant tests (e.g., Hausman, and the Wald test) were conducted both to decide
whether to use country fixed effect, random effect and year fixed effect. Hausman test
was conducted without clustering the standard errors both for mammals and birds’ threat
level. These tests favored using country fixed effect and year fixed effect estimations.
In all regression analysis, the standard errors are clustered at country level to be more
conservative in determining the statistical significance of the effects. In other words,
on average over the course of 17 years, if a country is able to increase the total size of
community-governed PAs by 10,000 km2, it is likely to reduce the IUCN Red List threat to
mammals by nearly 58% (−0.0178/0.0306) since the base-year 2000.
5. Discussion
Since any decrease in the threat level below threshold is considered substantially
important for a country’s performance towards conservation of endangered species, the
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overall magnitude of these results is crucial for sustainable development. Two important
implications can be derived from our findings:
First, in spite of the differences in legislations in different Sub-Saharan countries,
governance of protected areas matters. Consistent with earlier country specific studies, we
find variation in the biodiversity conservation outcomes of PAs attributable to differences
in the governance types of protected areas. Two main reasons can be associated with
this difference in aggregate trend. First, the level of threat to species depends on the
compliance of the community with conservation policies of governments. Previous studies
have documented an increase in endangerment of mammals in countries with relatively
centralized management and governance structures [51–54]. The positive coefficient of
variable state-governed PAs in Table 4 also shows the potential drawback of strictly state-
governed PAs for mammal’s conservation. In cases, where PAs are strictly governed by
states, communities often do not cooperate with state authorities due to the perception that
they are excluded from exploiting natural resources. The closer the livelihood attachment
with the resources in the PAs is, the stronger would be the level of community-resistance.
State-governed PAs do not achieve conservation goals due to the conflict with local people.
Conservation of endangered species needs a holistic approach in which local people play
a key role in protecting the resource. State machinery is not capable of safeguarding
a large biodiversity hotspot, which is surrounded by people whose activities directly
and indirectly affect the wildlife. For example, mammals are more vulnerable to illegal
activities, such as poaching and illegal hunting in areas where community compliance
with conservation strategies is low. A recent study on conflicts between local people
and government managers of protected areas in Kogyae Strict Nature Reserve (KSNR) in
Ghana reveals that imposition of conservation policies without effective participation of
local people forced them to increase illegal activities, such as hunting and encroachment,
resulting in uncontrolled conflicts in the KSNR [82]. Second, community-compliance
also depends on the nature of the good that is conserved. For a common good that carries
potential economic incentive, communities tend to conserve if they are given the authority,
responsibility, and control over related financial benefits. In community-governed PAs,
generally, the governments and international organizations agree on the distribution of
the share of the economic benefits generated as a result of activities within or around
PAs to the local community. In Sub-Saharan Africa, mammals are the most dominant
source of revenues for the community (if given their fair share), such as in the trophy
hunting industry.
Secondly, since the type of bottom-up approach to governing protected areas in each
country differs, therefore, it is important to understand the existence of matches and mis-
matches between national and global priorities by looking into each country’s legislation.
According to recent studies on Natura 2000, the World’s highly coordinated network of
protected areas in Europe, substantial mismatches are observed between protected areas’
management system of member country and regional conservation plans [83–85]. The
national conservation priorities in Sub-Saharan African countries can be more complex
given the fact that economic incentives are the most important driver for local people near
protected areas. While it is difficult to assess governance with each protected area covered
in this study, we provide an account of legislative differences in some of the Sub-Saharan
countries related to conservation of biodiversity [86]
In South Africa, the National Environmental Management Protected Areas Act (2003)
is in place to regulate protected areas. More specifically, the National Parks Act (1976)
remains in force, addressing matters related to national parks. The existing legislation does
not include any specific statement regarding wildlife ownership; however, the Protected
Areas Act sets out a “protected area system” and provides for consultation and public
participation that requires consultation of local authorities with lawful occupiers of lands.
Under this act, “the management authority may enter into an agreement with another
organ of state, local community, individual or other party for the co-management of the
area by the parties or the regulation of human activities that affect the environment in the
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area” [86] (p. 73). Such agreements may be intended to delegate powers, share benefits,
use biological resources, develop local management capacity and knowledge exchange. In
Tanzania, the main piece of legislation regarding conservation is the Wildlife Conservation
Act 2009. The Act includes emphasize on public participation and the involvement of
traditional communities as well as of the private sector (Section 5) in key decisions related
to conservation such as practiced in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. For hunting of
game animals or protected animals, the act requires a permit for the sustainable utilization
of wildlife [86] (p. 76). In Zimbabwe, the main legal framework related to conservation
is the Environmental Management Act (Cap. 20:27). Contrary to the emerging trend
in other countries that involve local communities in natural resource management, one
provision of the Environmental Management Act in Zimbabwe allows the President to set
aside areas of “communal land” for environmental purposes, including “conservation or
improvement of natural resources”, without providing for any consultation. In Botswana,
the principal legislation related to conservation is the Wildlife Conservation and National
Parks Act 1992 under which numerous regulations have been adopted. Section 83 of the
Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act grants the ownership of wild animals to
the owner of land on which animals are kept or confined within a game-proof fence. The
conservation planning is mostly done at the protected areas level where specific regulations
may be adopted. Under the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, different
types of licenses are introduced such as “bird licenses”, “single game licenses”, “small
game licenses” and “special game licenses” (secs. 26–38). In Namibia, the Environmental
Management Act 2007 provides a legislative framework for conservation and natural
resource management. The amended Nature Conservation Ordinance 1996 is a basic piece
of legislation providing for the establishment of “nature conservancies” specifically for
the involvement of local communities in wildlife management. Some provisions of the
Forest Act, enacted in 2001, govern community-based forest management and declares the
“living organisms” found in forests as a “forest produce”. Under the Wildlife Ordinance of
1996, which provides mechanism for management conserved areas, any group of persons
residing on communal land may be recognized as the “conservancy committee” of the area.
To do so, the committee must be representative of the community residing in the area, the
constitution of the committee must provide for the sustainable management of game and
the committee “must have the ability to manage funds and has an appropriate method
for the equitable distribution, to members of the community, of benefits derived from the
consumptive and non-consumptive use of game in such area” [86] (p. 22).
To sum up, there is a wide variety of legislative features ranging from the conservation
of biodiversity and specific endangered species and their habitats, to hunting tourism in
response to the needs and respect of the traditions of local populations in Sub-Saharan
African countries. A more adequate evaluation of legal frameworks should involve con-
sideration of many other factors, such as overall government objectives and their degree
of implementation within specific protected areas (e.g., the degree of decentralization),
existing administrative practices at various territorial levels and their effectiveness, experi-
ence in the implementation of existing legislation (e.g., provisions which have remained
dead letter, procedures which are bypassed in practice), local customs, public perception
of the role of law and authority, economic and social needs. This type of detail analysis is
obviously not possible for all countries.
The flagship Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is the best example to explain how community involvement in
PAs management positively affects conservation outcomes. To establish this link between
local community, income and mammal’s conservation, Taylor [44] documents that between
1989 and 2006, the CAMPFIRE income from high valued safari hunting amounted to
nearly US $30 million of which 52% were allocated to sub-districts wards and villages for
community projects and household benefits. The same study finds significant positive
trend in mammals’ conservation including elephants and buffalos’ populations. A number
of other studies have documented the positive effect of devolving responsibility, authority,
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and accountability of natural resource management on the attitude of local people towards
conservation [23,31,45,52,82,87].
We also find no effect of community-governed PAs on the IUCN Red List threat to
birds. This no-effect has interesting implications. First, as expected, the community does
not respond to the conservation of birds due to the lack of potential economic incentives as
compared to cases for mammals. Second, there might be an increasing threat to bird species
due to increased community involvement. Other unobserved factors, such as pollution or
other human factors, might also cause extinction of birds from PAs.
A widely recognized area of revenue generation in Sub-Saharan Africa is the community-
based trophy hunting industry which has been promoted as an effective strategy for
conservation of endangered animals since the 1980s [10,12,23,37–40,52,88]. One argument
is that the income from trophy hunting activities can empower local communities to protect
biodiversity through employment of more anti-poaching rangers. If revenue cannot be
generated from trophy hunting, the communities might transform the natural habitats to
other forms of land use that provide higher returns on investment compared to conservation
but will have negative impacts on biodiversity. Moreover, trophy hunting also generates
revenue in areas, which are not suitable for tourism including countries facing political
instability and adverse geographic conditions. According to Lindsey [23], a minimum of
1,394,000 km2 is used for trophy hunting in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is larger than the
area occupied by national parks. In 2006, trophy hunting was practiced in 23 Sub-Saharan
African countries with an estimate of USD 201 million per year gross revenues compared
to USD 33–39 million dollars in Eurasia [89].
Most of the successful cases of these programs reflect a significantly positive effect
on the livelihood of the local community along with conservation outcomes. For example,
Di Minin [89] argues that hunting in Sub-Saharan African has strongly contributed to
the conservation efforts in those conservancies of important terrestrial biodiversity where
trophy hunting is practiced (Table 5). Studies also cite trophy hunting as a key component
of community-based conservation in Sub-Saharan countries [23]. In parts of Zambia,
Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, improvement in conservation attitude
among local communities has resulted in increasing revenues from trophy hunting. In
addition, in these countries, communities are increasingly involved in community-based
natural resource management programs and attempt to include their lands in wildlife
management projects [10,29]. Similarly, in Namibia, revenues from trophy hunting are
considered a primary stimulus for development of wildlife conservancies on more than
70,000 km2 of communally owned areas [9]. Further, in Tanzania, incentives from trophy
hunting have resulted into the creation of Wildlife Management Areas where sustainable
wildlife utilization is the primary land use [23].
The inference we draw from our findings in this context is subject to the assumption
that WDPA dataset does not have significant reporting or measurement errors. As we
know WDPA data is compiled through surveys by different government agencies, there is
possibility of misreporting or erroneous reporting of the types of data representing each
protected area. While econometric models we apply largely overcome such measurement
errors, we still suggest readers to refer to the caveats and limitations of WDPA datasets
provided in Section 7.
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6. Conclusions
Community-governed PAs can be used as an effective conservation policy that enables
countries to achieve biodiversity conservation outcomes not at the cost of social exclusion.
In this paper, we provide empirical support for the argument that decentralization and
devolving the authority, responsibility and accountability of natural resource management
help reduce threat to biodiversity. More specifically, we adopted three different methods to
test our hypothesis that community-governed PAs do better than strictly state-governed
PAs in terms of biodiversity conservation.
Following the generalized DID approach, we find that on average, countries with
a significant increase in cumulative size of community-governed PAs are likely to de-
creases the IUCN threat to mammals by nearly 17% as compared to those countries where
community-governed PAs size is less than half of the total PAs. Our synthetic control
methods and OLS panel fixed effect results support the hypothesis that increasing the size
of community-governed PAs is likely to reduce the IUCN Threat to mammals. On the
other hand, the effect of community-governed PAs on the threat to birds is rather positive
but not statistically significant, indicating no effect of governance type on the threatened
birds’ population in Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition, increasing the size of
state-governed PAs does not do better for conservation. Our analysis of 32 Sub-Saharan
countries shows no effect of state-governed PAs on the IUCN Red List threat to mam-
mals and birds indicating less effectiveness of strictly state-governed PAs compared to
community-governed PAs. In spite of the significant effect in countries with larger size
of community-governed protected, we acknowledge the difference between national con-
servation policies and regional plans. We provide a brief description of the legislative
frameworks within Sub-Saharan African countries and identify specific regulations related
to conservation of biodiversity. We, therefore, conclude that establishment of PAs does help
achieve biodiversity conservation outcomes if such efforts do not exclude communities
that heavily depend on the natural resources in and around biodiversity hotspots. Ad-
dressing social concerns of communities at risk with more innovative approaches, such as
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stakeholder analysis, and simulation models, can ameliorate the potential conflict between
state authorities and local people [90].
Our results suggest that more inclusive governance that devolves authority, respon-
sibility, and accountability of natural resource management (particularly in PAs) to the
local communities can address the challenge of conservation as well poverty by giving
fair share of the benefits to local people. However, government of protected areas at local
level in each of Sub-Saharan countries needs to be in line with national legislations and
regional conservation plans to achieve sustainable outcomes. Merely establishment of
strictly state-governed PAs might negatively affect the conservation objectives if local
communities are excluded from the benefits of natural resources in designated areas.
In a broader context, sustainable development that achieves social and environmental
(biodiversity) objectives is possible through inclusion of local communities in environment
decision making particularly in developing countries.
7. Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study is subject to some limitations that should be considered while interpreting
the findings. First, the biodiversity measure adopted in this study is the IUCN Red List of
threatened mammals and birds. There is another genesis of species, such as amphibians,
which are also important in defining the overall status of biodiversity. Thus, our results
are only limited to mammals and birds identified as threatened from 2000 to 2016. Taking
into consideration all species in measuring biodiversity might be more comprehensive in
analyzing the effectiveness of PAs governance.
Secondly, despite the usefulness of WDPA datasets for categorizing and classifying
protected areas, it is important to point out certain limitations while using WDPA database.
In this context, we provide a careful assessment as to what extent WDPA data could be
utilized for analytical purposes and how it can be improved for future analyses. The WDPA
database informs about the key indicators that allow governments and international orga-
nizations to track progress toward area-based conservation targets. The primary sources of
data in the WDPA continues to be government organizations and departments responsi-
ble for conservation of biodiversity in identified regions. Therefore, either deliberate or
unintended flaws are possible on part of agencies that report the data about the status or
governance-type of conservation areas. We acknowledge this potential gap that might
exist in the countries’ national statistics and hence, adopt a more conservative approach
in using the datasets. We also note that where there are known gaps in official national
data, these gaps are filled by experts working individually or through affiliations with
non-governmental organizations, institutions and more [91]. Considering the governance
type, our key variable, it is important to understand the construct validity of this variable.
The key concepts of IUCN governance category include, participation, innovation, benefits
sharing, respect and informed approval of the stakeholders. According to IUCN, the
purpose of creating this variable is to measure the extent to which full and effective partici-
pation of relevant stakeholders including local peoples is ensured, and the proportion of
benefits shared equitably [26]. The variation we find in the cumulative size of protected
areas differenced by governance types ensures that the WDPA as a whole is ideal only for
global analyses, though some parts of it may be well suited to regional or national analyses.
We acknowledge this inconsistency in using WDPA for analysis as they can impact upon
results. Moreover, our model that accounts for country-specific characteristics and time
trend within each country allows us to draw inference about the variation in governance
types and its impact on the IUCN red list. We suggest that in order to improve the WDPA
datasets for future research purposes, country specific profile of protected areas should be
ranked through a standard index that is consistent and applicable on all types of protected
areas. This type of index must ensure the internal and external validity of the measurement
of governance type rather than merely classifying the governance-type subjectively. In
addition, separation of set of countries with different reporting standards for protected
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areas is also desirable to allow for more robustness checks of the impact of inclusiveness
on conservation outcomes.
Thirdly, our sample is composed of 32 Sub-Saharan African countries for which the
data on all variables was available. Our results only apply to countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa or those that share similar socio-economic characteristics. Fourthly, we aggre-
gate the types of governance of protected areas into three broad categories; community-
governed, state-governed, and protected areas about which governance status is not
reported. Our findings take a general classification of governance rather than each specific
sub-classification of governance, such as partially-devolved governance, collaborative
(joint) governance, or governance by private owners. PAs in Sub-Saharan Africa do not
have identical enforcement authorities, e.g., the range of community involvement varies. A
further analysis of each sub-type of governance might be useful in explaining the extent of
conservation success in protected areas. Lastly, although the IUCN is the only organization
around the world that records the data on PAs management and governance, there might
still be PAs which are not designated yet contributing to the national statistics on the Red
List. Our assumption is that if such PAs exist, they are normally distributed, and thus we
rule out any systematic relationship with our estimates.
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